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thousand hectares, which decreased to 162.9 thousand hectares per year from 1993 to 1998. Beginning in 1999, the annually planted forest acreage is increasing, but that cannot avoid the current scarcity of roundwood.
Insert graph 3 here
In part due to the reduction of reforestation acreage during the 1990s, there was a decrease in the stock of planted forests as well as the planted tree inventory between 1985 and 1995 (table 1 
Insert table 1 here
Several authors, such as SBS (2000) and Bacha et al (2000) , had predicted the scarcity of roundwood from planted forests. However, that scarcity was more visible after September 2002.
From September 2002 to May 2003, roundwood prices rose from 63% to 130%, depending on the sort of roundwood and the place where it was sold 4 . For comparison, Brazilian inflation was 11.6% at the same period.
Advancing that problem, large roundwood consumers, such as pulp industries and pig iron makers, enlarged their annually planted acreage since 1999, notably since 2001. However, there are a lot of small consumers of roundwood (such as small sawmills, plywood makers, pottery mills, bakeries, for example) that do not have enough capital to plant forests. It is not sure, one on hand, that pig iron and pulp makers will establish planted forests in order to offer roundwood for these small consumers 5 ; and, on the other hand, large planted forests are not placed necessarily near to small consumers of roundwood.
Due to the current roundwood scarcity in Brazil, which affects primarily small consumers of that raw input, it becomes necessary the discussion of policies to foster the enlargement of reforestation in that country. Currently, there are social and political demands for these policies, especially because neighboring countries (such as Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile) have been granting these incentives (SBS, 2000) . However, the discussion needs to take into account what was done in Brazil in the past.
-The phases of Brazil's reforestation expansion
According to Antonangelo & Bacha (1998) , the expansion of reforestation in Brazil had three phases 6 . The first corresponded to the period ranging from the discovery of Brazil to the beginning of fiscal incentives granted to reforestation or afforestation projects (it was the period from 1500 to 1965). The second phase happened when fiscal incentives were granted to the reforestation or afforestation projects, from 1966 to 1988. The third phase was initiated after the fiscal incentives granted to the reforestation/afforestation were finished and no other stimulus was granted (from 1989 to 2001) . A fourth phase can be added. Beginning in 2002, Federal Government recognized the scarcity of roundwood in Brazil and it is trying to implement new policies to stimulate reforestation. The following four sections analyzes each phase above mentioned.
-The period before to the fiscal incentives granted to the reforestation/afforestation 7
When Brazil was discovered, the destruction of its natural forests started; meantime, few reforestations took place until 1965. During that period, the nation watched this process with relative passivity. Everything that was implemented in terms of tree plantation and reconstitution of Brazil's forest patrimony was always insignificant in relation to what was done in terms of deforestation.
Until the 1940s, there were mainly pioneering efforts in the introduction of homogeneous eucalyptus or pines plantations. A large part of these plantations had scientific or ornamental intentions. The main foresters were railroad and paper companies, as well as forest research institutes. They established large reforested areas.
-The reforestation in the 1950s and the 1960s
In 1950, Brazil had a significant inventory of planted forests (1,128,994 hectares 
-The period of fiscal incentives granted to the reforestation/afforestation
Due to fiscal incentives granted to reforestation, Brazilian forestry turned into a new phase. It was characterized by: a) an increase in the entrepreneurial activity concerning forestry;
b) an enlargement of the number of skilled workers working in that activity; c) a great evolution of forest science; and, d) a large growth of Brazil's planted forests.
In the 1960s, when the forest sector began to be considered with more attention, the Brazilian Institute of Forest Development, IBDF, was created (it was founded in 1968, and became part of the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Natural Resources, IBAMA, in 1989) .
In that decade, the first Forest Engineering Colleges were created and were implemented fiscal facilities, which fostered reforestation projects on a wide scale (Antonangelo, 1996) .
-Federal policies to stimulate the reforestation in Brazil
According to Bacha (1993) , two basic mechanisms exist to stimulate reforestation: the first one is the increasing exploitation cost of natural forests, and the second one is the grants of monetary incentives to foster tree plantations, such as subsidized credit, fiscal incentives, and the donation of inputs. These incentives act by reducing the cost of homogeneous forest implantation.
From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Brazil's federal government accomplished three programs to encourage reforestation projects. Fiscal incentives occur when an entrepreneur or person who is a taxpayer (named taxpayer-investor) destines a share of his income tax to invest in a specific project elaborated by another firm, called beneficiary firm 9 . In the PIFFR, the same person or group of persons could be both taxpayer-investor and beneficiary firm owner.
Fiscal incentives were granted to establish homogeneous tree plantation, but not necessarily woody tree plantation. There were many projects of reforestation that had gotten fiscal incentives to plant fruit trees (such as apple, mango, cashew, coconut, and others), palmtrees, Prosopis juliflora ("algarobeira"), and bamboo. There is no agreement about how many fiscal incentives were granted to reforestation projects. and July 6 th 1982, respectively. The scheme adopted in the state of São Paulo was to grant loans to farmers whose farms' total area did not exceed 300 hectares, and for planting at most 20 hectares per farm (since that amount has been equal or less than 20% of the total surface). These loans financed 100% of the project budget (adding 1% of the value of the loan for supporting the expenditures with the project elaboration and technical assistance). The interest rate was 18% per year, without indexation, and the farmers had eight-year deferment (Bergamasco & Bergamasco, 1988; and Yamazoe et al., 1988) . In order to evaluate that loan conditions, it can be stated that in the time period from 1978 to 1982 the annual average inflation rate was 85%. Therefore, it was a subsidized loan, with negative real interest rate.
The REPEMIR was implemented in the state of São Paulo from 1978 to 1983, having been benefited 565 farmers and 5,831 hectares were reforested (Yamazoe 13 et al., 1988, p. 4-5) .
According to Bergamasco & Bergamasco (1988) some unexpected incidents happened in that program, such as the fact of some farms with more than 300 hectares had used resources from REPEMIR, and some cases of bad management of reforestation projects. The last were mainly observed in low profitable projects and in projects where seedlings died and were not replaced.
Unfortunately, there is little information about the monetary resources used in the REPEMIR as well as concerning its results. During the Fourth Brazilian Forest Congress (that occurred on May 10-15, 1982) , the president of the extinct Brazilian Institute of Forest Development, Mauro Silva Reis, made the following statement (Reis, 1982, p.15-16 ):
"The REPEMIR reaches the great part of the Brazilian states, having already been applied, until that time, resources that amount Cr$ 400 million. They are sufficient for planting almost 80 thousand hectares of forests and for the production of 130 million of fast-growing tree seedlings. These resources are granted to the state departments of agriculture, which, in turn, foster small and medium farmers to plant forests. In the state of Minas Gerais, that program has had a great performance. In that state, five agreements were established between the State Forest Institute (IEF) and the Brazilian Institute of Forest Development (IBDF). They sum approximately Cr$ 100 million, which is sufficient to plant 18 thousand hectares of forests, and to produce 35 million of seedlings." 
The Algaroba Project
There are trees that flourish in Brazil's northeast arid climate region as well as breed quickly and supply wood and food to both cattle and human consumption. One of these trees belongs to the Prosopis' genus. Prosopis juliflora (SW) DC, known generically as algarobeira, is the most prospect specie that grows in Brazil's Northeast region. According to Lima (1985, p.30) the algarobeira:
"Grows in sandy ground, in regions where rain precipitation varies from 150 to 600 mm annually. Its roundwood is used to produce pegs, farm post, firewood, and charcoal. Its broad bean, with high protein concentration, is an excellent source of food for both cattle and human consumption. "
Given the advantages of the algarobeira, and the advances of technology for processing its wood and beans, the Brazilian federal government decided to stimulate its implantation through the Program of Fiscal Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation. According to Reis (1985, p.34) , that program authorized the planting of 93,252 hectares with algarobeira from 1979 to 1984. It represented 11.9% of the total tree plantations approved by IBDF, using fiscal incentives, in the Brazil's Northeast region in that period.
Besides the grants of fiscal incentives for planting algarobeira in Brazil's Northeast region, there was another program that was elaborated by the federal government to foster the planting of that tree in the same region. It was the Algaroba Project.
The motivation for establishing that project was the severe drought that occurred from 1979 to 1983 in Brazil's Northeast region, and the good performance of the algarobeira in that region. The Algaroba Project lasted from 1985 to 1988 and was consisted of the production and free distribution of Prosopis juliflora seedlings, grants of free technical assistance, and financial support to the farmers placed in SUDENE's jurisdiction (all Brazil's Northeast region plus the Northern part of Minas Gerais state).
Resources from FINSOCIAL and BNDES supported the Algaroba Project, and it was coordinated by the National Department of Agricultural Production (SNAP), a member of the Ministry of Agriculture, with the participation of the Departments of Agriculture from Brazil's Northeast States. According to Silva (1989, p. 23 Partially compensating the lack of federal stimulus to reforestations, some states governments, mainly the states of Minas Gerais, São Paulo and Paraná and also large consumers of forest raw inputs (such as pulp industry and pig iron makers) have elaborated some programs to foster small and medium farmers to reforest fallow areas of their farms. These programs grant seedlings and, in some cases, agricultural inputs and technical assistance are also given freely.
Private and state fomentation programs are very important in terms of reforestation expansion. From 1991 to 2001, these programs were responsible for 33 thousand hectares reforested annually, which represented 19% of the total surface reforested annually in Brazil at the same period. According to BACHA et al. (2000) , these programs allowed farmers to yield high profits in reforestation projects, especially when these programs offer arrangements to farmers not only to make clearcuttings, but also to sell the roundwood. It is the case of the Forest
Farmer Program in the state of Minas Gerais. Into this Program, small farmers can reach 30% as internal rate of return in their reforestations. However, the actual dimensions of those private and state programs cannot solve the scarcity of roundwood in Brazil in next few years.
-Time period beginning in 2002
In it will not be done 16 . The conditions of these loans are more appropriate for large forest firms (such as pulp enterprises, wood-based panels producers and pig iron makers), but they are not qualified for these loans.
It is important to notice that these programs are the same used to stimulate crop expansion in Brazil, what have different biological features of tree planting. Moreover, these programs were launched without a precise evaluation about the faults of previous programs conducted by Federal Government and other alternatives to stimulate reforestation. That evaluation is conducted in the following section.
-Social evaluation of the federal policies implemented to stimulate the reforestation
It was observed above that fiscal incentive policy had a positive impact on the expansion of reforestation in Brazil. However, it is necessary to make a social evaluation of that program. In order to fulfill that task, first the implantation costs per hectare between REPEMIR and PIFFR are compared. After that, the equitable and distributive effects of the PIFFR are analyzed.
-Comparing the implantation costs of 1 hectare between the PIFFR and REPEMIR
Several information exist about the resources used by the Program of Fiscal Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation, but otherwise there is little information concerning monetary resources allocated to REPEMIR, and no information about Algaroba Project. Table 3 shows the values granted to each hectare in the first two programs, for Brazil and for two specific states.
Insert table 3 here
The data on Table 3 show that the costs per hectare reforested through the Program of Fiscal Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation were from 10 to 15 times larger than the costs faced by REPEMIR. It occurred because REPEMIR subsidized fewer items and for shorter duration than PIFFR did. Berger (1979) showed that the Federal Government was granting during the 1970s more fiscal incentives per hectare of planted forests than what would be necessary. The reason for that, probably, were the influences performed by specific social groups 17 that took advantages of fiscal incentives (Soto B., 1992).
-The evaluation of the equitable and distributive effects in the PIFFR
Fiscal incentives are a form of indirect subsidy that allows the reduction of implantation costs of investment projects. Consequently, a reduction in the production costs of goods and services will happen. However, fiscal incentives cause three negative effects: i) they diminish the progressive tax rates in the national tariff system, ii) they treat in different forms economic agents with the same income, and iii) economic agents who are not taxpayers cannot use that subsidy. (PRADO, 1990, p. 10-11) . That court concluded that 50% of the reforestation areas stimulated by PIFFR, around the whole country, were older than the optimum age to be clearcut. Besides, these clearcuttings were unprofitable.
These situations occurred because there is not a consuming market or because the costs of roundwood transportation from these projects to the consuming markets were so large, due to the long distances between both.
-Cost/benefit analysis of the Program of Fiscal Incentives for Afforestation and Reforestation
In competitive markets, as the case of the majority of in nature forest products, the equilibrium price is established by the crossing of the supply and demand curves (case of Figure   1 ). In other words, the equilibrium price is the one that equals the wishes of consumers and producers.
Insert figure 1 here
In the case of Figure 1 , the consumers are paying P o per unit of product consumed. Adding both economic surpluses (consumer and producer surpluses) the total economic surplus (equal the area BEAB in Figure 1 ) is obtained.
The fiscal incentives have the effect of reducing the production cost, shifting the supply curve to the right. When this occurs, an increase in the total economic surplus appears. That increase can be understood as a social benefit from the policy that shifts the supply curve to the right. The dimensions of the social benefit can be different according to the type of shift in the supply curve (if parallel or pivotal).
In Figure 2 , the pivotal shift of the supply curve is showed, i.e., the supply curve was shifted to the right, but keeping constant its intercept with vertical axis. The enlargement of the total economic surplus is given by area EABCE.
Insert figure 2 here
In Figure 3 , the parallel shift of the supply curve of roundwood from reforestation is showed. The enlargement of the total economic surplus is given by area EABCFE.
Insert figure 3 here
The increase of the economic surplus is a measure of the total social benefit that came from fiscal incentives granted to stimulate reforestation.
To measure the Total Social Benefit (TSB), the following equations can be used (according to LINDNER & JARRET, 1978; and, ROSE, 1980) :
for the pivotal shift of the supply curve or
for the parallel shift of the supply curve
Where:
P 0 and Q 0 are the price and quantity of equilibrium for roundwood from reforestation, respectively, before the grants of fiscal incentives. 
According to ROSE (1980) , Z is calculated by the following equation:
Taking the point (Q s 2t , P 0 ) in Figure 2 , the price-elasticity in the supply curve (ε s ) can be calculated using:
Equation (5) shows that K can be measured by the proportional change in the production divided by the price-elasticity of supply (ε s ). Therefore, in order to calculate K it is necessary to have an estimate of the supplied product before and after the grant of fiscal incentive and keeping the price in P 0 .
To calculate the price-elasticity of the demand and supply for roundwood from reforestation (ε d and ε s , respectively), the following model is suggested 19 : PMP t = price of one unit of roundwood from reforestation at the time t.
PMN t = price of one unit of roundwood from natural forest at the time t.
R t = Gross Domestic Product at the time t.
IF t-5 = the amount of fiscal incentives granted to the reforestation at the time t−5.
Equation (6) is a traditional demand equation. The determinants of quantity demanded of roundwood are its price, the price of substitute goods, and the income of consumers. Otherwise, in equation (7) the determinants of quantity offered of roundwood are its price, the fiscal incentives granted in the past to foster the reforestation, and the previous production of roundwood. This last variable represents the effect of productive capacity of planted forests on the current production.
L indicates that the variable has its value taken in logarithm. So, the price-elasticity can be obtained directly from the equations (6) and (7), respectively.
The signs expected for the coefficients of equation (6) and (7) The two-stage least square method was used to estimate the demand and supply equation of roundwood from reforestation [equation (6) and (7)]. The RATS was the program used.
Firewood quantities and prices have been used as proxy for quantity and price of roundwood from reforestation, respectively. These information and others that are necessary to estimate equations (6) and (7) Where: the subscript * indicates the coefficient is significant at 1% level; **, significant at 5%; ***, significant at 10% level; ****, significant at 25% level; n/s, not significant; s/a, without residual autocorrelation;
According to equations (8) and (9), ε d = 3.107283 and ε
The value of K is calculated per year, and a different value of Q S 2t for each year is obtained. Considering 1971 as being the period zero, the following equation is used to calculate
L QMP t S = 2.806303 + 1.798338⋅L(9.61) + 0.003404434⋅IF t-5 + 0.00003379⋅QMP (10) t-1 S or L QMP t S = 6.8755898 + 0.003404434⋅IF t-5 + 0.00003379⋅QMP (11) t-1 S In equation (10), 9.61 is the price per unit of roundwood at the time zero (it is P o ). So, using the equation (11) it is possible to measure the shift of supply curve of roundwood due to fiscal incentives.
Using the different annual values of Q S 2t , obtained from the equation (11), and the annual data of the P t and IF t-5 (according to Table 4), the annual values of K are calculated (these values are put on Table 5 ). The latter are used together the values of price-elasticity of demand (ε d ) and supply (ε s ) in order to calculate the values of Z (also put on Table 5 ).
Insert table 5 here
Finally, using the annual values from 1972 to 1990 of K and Z, and also using ε d , P 0 and Q 0 , the annual values of the total social benefit generated by fiscal incentives are calculated. Two different estimates are obtained: considering a pivotal shift of the supply curve, and a parallel shift of that curve (these values are on Table 5 ).
According to the values from Third, the number of firms and farmers awarded with fiscal incentives was limited due to the minimum area size established to approve the reforestation projects.
-The Distribution of resources among the beneficiary firms
As already commented, just the income taxpayers had been able to apply for deduction and application of fiscal incentives. Due to it, the majority of the farmers (who do not pay income tax in Brazil) had not been able to assume the position of the taxpayer-investor. Moreover, the available information suggests that the most part of beneficiary firms was not also agricultural producers.
According to IPEA/COMIF(1986, p. 94-96) , from 1971 to 1982 roughly 53% of the total reforested area stimulated by fiscal incentives had belonged by only 99 beneficiary firms. Among these firms, about 40% were subsidized enterprises of other companies operating in sectors as pig iron, paper and pulp, lumber and wood-based panels, and production of energy. Among these 99 beneficiary firms there is a concentration in relation to fiscal incentives received. The 10 largest companies of reforestation, among the 99 large beneficiary firms, had been responsible for 24.5%
of the total reforested area established by those beneficiary firms.
Thus, it can be concluded that the fiscal incentives granted to the reforestation had benefited, in a larger ratio, large firms, which in many times were subsidiaries of other companies operating in activities where the forest raw material is used as an input in the process of production. Consequently, wealth concentration happened among companies located in Brazil, because part of them could invest share of their income tax as capital investment in their subsidiary firms.
-Conclusions
The reduction of the annual average area of homogeneous reforestation from 1993 to 1997 resulted in a scarcity of roundwood production from planted forests in Brazil during the first decade of the 21 st century. That situation put in a high position the discussion about new policies to foster the enlargement of reforestation in Brazil.
The fiscal incentives to the reforestation had a positive effect on the homogeneous reforestation expansion from 1966 to 1986, but its social costs were very large in relation to its social benefits. The ample grants of fiscal incentives resulted in a bad use of them. Low interest rate loans to stimulate reforestation were tried in the past and they are tried nowadays. Alike as it happened in the past, the results of these loans are small in terms of reforested areas. Otherwise, federal and state experiences in the promotion of reforestation in small and medium farms since the 1990s have been showed an alternative with low costs per reforested hectare. However, the dimensions of these programs are not sufficient to solve the scarcity of roundwood in Brazil in the next few years.
Fomentation programs consisted of the donation of seedlings and, some times, agricultural inputs and technical assistance are offered freely. The case of the Forest Farmer
Program in the state of Minas Gerais showed that kind of reforestation program has allowed the farmers to make larger profit when the industrial firm gives the adequate support to the farmers during the clearcutting of forest, and in the commercialization of the roundwood. In addition, the reforestation in small and medium farmers does not result in land ownership concentration like the large reforestation does.
Basing on the above showed, new policies centered in the promotion of reforestation in small and medium farms can be suggested to solve the roundwood scarcity in Brazil. The free donation of seedlings, agricultural inputs (as insecticides) and technical assistance has low cost per reforested hectare and also presents larger social return than the use of fiscal incentive.
However, these programs need to be followed by some mechanisms that give to farmers an adequate support during the clearcutting of forests, and in the commercialization of the wood to be produced.
It can appear at the first glimpse an out-of date proposal to give new stimulus to plant forests in Brazil. However, this impression is not true. First, the price mechanism is not solving the current scarcity of roundwood. Second, the government would work together to consumers of roundwood in order to make farmers more sensible to the signals of market. Third, there is social demand for new reforestation policies, especially because they exist in other South American countries. Forth, increasing the offer of roundwood, new industrial activities would be held, and social benefits such as the enlargement of income and job will happen. 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 year hectares planted forests
Source: updating of dataset showed by Bacha et al. (2000) . includes all planted species and the data was collected from the CD-ROM of Agricultural Census. That value is larger than the similar one that exists in printed edition of the same Census. This is because the printed edition of Agricultural Census did not compute all planted species of trees. 1 That wood is in the forms of firewood, charcoal and logs.
2 That is the age when normally trees are clearcut to produce chips. However, in some Brazil's regions it is possible to make the first clearcutting when forest is five year old in order to produce firewood. 3 It was considered the reforestation made in small and medium farmers fostered by public programs in Minas Gerais and Paraná states, special programs in the state of São Paulo and those stimulated by pulp and pig iron makers. The small and medium reforestation fostered by other enterprises and states as well as the reforestation established by small and medium farmers without any incentive could not be computed. 4 This information refers to roundwood sold at the state of São Paulo. Prices of firewood had large increase than prices of pulpwood, for example. 5 Bacha (2003) showed pulp industries and pig iron makers decide how much to plant considering their demands of logs more than the prices of roundwood. 6 Due to the importance of fiscal incentives to the reforestation, Leite (1979) had considered, at the end of 1970s, two phases in the evolution of Brazil's forest sector: before 1965 and after 1965. Here, we add to the Leite's division a new phase, what started after the end of fiscal incentives granted to the reforestation.
